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Palaeo-PhilosoPhy: ComPlex and ConCePt 
in arChaiC Patterns of thought
Paul s. macdonald
AbstrAct: this paper argues that efforts to understand historically remote patterns of  thought 
are driven away from their original meaning if  the investigation focuses on reconstruction of  
concepts. it is simply not appropriate to be looking for an archaic concept of  soul, name or dream, 
for example, when considering the earliest documents which attest to their writers’ (and others’) 
beliefs about certain types of  phenomena. instead, we propose to employ the notion of  cognitive 
complex (as elaborated in the work of  Piaget, Vygotsky, and hallpike) in order to investigate 
some important philosophical themes in ancient egyptian, ancient iranian, and ancient near 
eastern documents. our principal theoretical claim is that archaic thought does not work with 
concepts but with complexes whose salient features are an over-abundance of  properties, an over-
production of  connections, and weakness in abstraction. the basic level of  complex formation 
may be the most inclusive level at which it is possible to form a mental image. specific studies 
are focused on ancient texts which exhibit archaic patterns of  thought. in egyptian texts, 
“manifestation” (kheperu) seems to convey something which all categories of  beings are capable 
of  becoming, being and having, assuming and leaving; the “name” (ren) was considered to be 
an essential component of  the individual’s survival; symbolic representations, such as images 
and words, are causally connected to the ‘objects’ the image or word signifies. in ane records 
the human etemmu was plainly the corpse or skeleton of  the dead person; on the other hand it 
was also the shadowy, volatile image of  what he was during life. in ane records the baffling 
idea of  the divine me referred to an entire cultural area, an acquisition of  civilized life; but at 
the same time it is also the result of  an invention, a divine decision. the complexes involved in 
these archaic ideas about soul, name and dream are ideas fused with their ‘objects’; they have 
unstable traits and prototypical instances; and are thought at the most abstract level which have 
concrete images. 
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i.
this paper argues that efforts to understand historically remote patterns of  thought 
are driven away from their original meaning if  the investigation focuses on reconstruc-
tion of  concepts. it is simply not appropriate to be looking for an archaic concept of  soul, 
name or dream, for example, when considering the earliest documents which attest to 
their writers’ (and others’) belief  about certain types of  phenomena. not only does the 
historian often have great difficulties in identifying and explaining relevant concepts 
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across vast stretches of  time, it may be misleading to look for anything like a concept 
at all. the basic meaning of  ‘concept’ is an idea that can be applied to many ‘objects’, 
an idea that is universal across a type, and not particular to an instance or token; it is 
abstract in its intension, i.e. it signifies an object-class in virtue of  common features; and 
general in its extension, i.e. it can pick out numerous particulars that satisfy conditions 
for class-inclusion. on the Kantian view, a concept is a product of  the understanding 
operating on empirical content supplied by the sensory faculties. thus a single empirical 
concept (as opposed to an apriori, categorical concept) has a stable meaning associated 
with its object-class’s essential properties. the concept is a unity of  rule that determines 
all that is manifold in sensory intuition of  objects and limits it to conditions that make 
possible a conformity to type.
With regard to archaic patterns of  thought, my thesis is not that different thinkers 
(or writers) across vast stretches of  time had different ideas about mind, soul and spirit, 
for example—that is true, but trivial. the concept of  mind in the stoics is different 
than the concept of  mind in aristotle, and different than the concept of  mind in Plato; 
each gives their own account of  the nature and functions of  nous. in the contemporary 
arena, there is much disagreement about the concept of  consciousness: what is the most 
suitable model or metaphor, what sorts of  neural states “count as” the causal support 
for mental states, whether brain states are identical with mental states, and so forth. 
however, for any given theory of  consciousness—whatever its nature, structure and 
function are said to be—the concept of  consciousness applies to, and is exemplified by, all 
and only those beings that possess it. despite the bewildering variety of  theories about 
the essential features and operations of  consciousness, insofar as any entity is conscious 
the concept applies to it. my thesis in a nutshell is that the earliest written records 
(c.000-500 BCe) which deploy words like “soul”, “name”, and “dream” do not attest 
to anything like the concepts of  soul, name or dream. Close analysis of  texts that use 
soul-like words, for example, do not reveal that there is anything like a general abstract 
idea of  “soul” in virtue of  which some kind (or kinds) of  thing can be said to have soul. 
archaic patterns of  thought do not differ from our “modern” patterns in having differ-
ent concepts, but in not having anything like concepts at all.
the sort of  texts suitable for or task are drawn from three quite different cultures 
and date from approximately the same time, the second half  of  the second millennium. 
from the ancient near east our sources are The Epic of  Gilgamesh, Atrahasis the Supersage, 
Adapa and the South Wind, and Enuma Elish. The Epic of  Gilgamesh is the longest and most 
famous ane narrative; in many episodes it recounts the story of  a hero-king’s quest 
for fame and immortality. during a state-sponsored surge of  literary collection and 
invention in the Kassite period (c.500) many widely scattered tablets from this epic 
were sorted and inventoried. The Myth of  Atrahasis “the super-sage” concerns a figure of  
immense prestige and antiquity; known by various names and epithets, his fame spread 
through many lands and languages; the text of  Atrahasis in old Babylonian dates from 
. Kant, Critique of  Pure Reason a03-06. 
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c.700. the Enuma Elish (or Epic of  Creation) is a very well preserved and lengthy nar-
rative, inscribed on seven tablets, whose composition has been very difficult to date; it 
could be anytime between 900 and 00 BCe. the text of  Adapa and the South Wind 
is overly brief  and incomplete, since it lacks the final scene(s); written in akkadian, it 
dates from c.400-300 BCe. from ancient egypt, our attention will focus on the vari-
ous Books of  the Underworld (the best known of  which is the Book of  the Dead) in the new 
Kingdom (c.540-075 BCe), as well as some literary and pseudo-literary texts, such as 
“the dispute Between a man and his ba”, “the eloquent Peasant”, and “merikare’s 
instructions”. from ancient iran, the only extant documents in the avestan language 
are the avestan scriptures, the sacred Writings of  Zarathustra the prophet. one set 
of  central texts, the gāthās or “songs”, are considerably older than other texts in these 
scriptures, and have only recently been convincingly dated to c.000-200 BCe.
ii. aBstraCt general ConCePts and CognitiVe ComPlexes
in contrast with abstract general categories, primitive classification was concerned 
to impose some sort of  order on aspects of  experience that are practically or ritually 
significant for a given society. it was not concerned with a system of  logical inferences 
or with the construction of  genus-species taxonomies. Primitive thought is static not 
dynamic, tied into the phenomenal properties of  things and events, and is dominated 
by concrete associations, in the ordering of  which prototypical imagery is of  special 
importance.2 in an effort to capture in one word the sort of  thinking that operates under 
these conditions, Piaget proposed the term ‘collection’ and Vygotsky proposed the term 
‘complex’. abstract and formal cognition works with concepts, and although the princi-
ples of  class (or set) may not be known, it classifies things with a genus-species hierarchy. 
at an earlier, more fluid stage the “complex grouping may vary from item to item; the 
intension of  different complexes may overlap; and the intension may be dominated by 
use, function, and association rather than by taxonomic criteria.”3
Piaget said that at an early stage of  development the child treats classification as the 
construction of  a complex concrete object which only exists when its parts or elements 
are in physical relations with the whole. groups of  this sort must behave according to 
four operatory rules: closure, associativity, identity and inversion.4 Vygotsky said that in 
a cognitive complex, “individual objects are united in the child’s mind not only by his 
subjective impressions but also by bonds actually existing between these objects.” these 
bonds are concrete and factual, based on everyday experiences, rather than on gener-
alized abstractions; the elements of  the complex have a functional and concrete unity, 
rather than logical coherence. While a cognitive concept groups objects according to 
their possession of  at least one common attribute, “the bonds relating the elements of  
a complex to the whole and to one another may be as diverse as the contacts and rela-
2. hallpike 979 p. 69.
3. hallpike 979 p. 74.
4. Piaget 972; seltman 985 pp. 38-54.
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tions are in reality.”5 he compares a complex in this sense to a family of  ideas, such that 
having any one of  a multiplicity of  diverse relations is sufficient for an element to be 
given a family name. in addition to such associative complexes, there are also functional 
complexes, where both have a nucleus of  prototypical elements. in chain complexes, 
the decisive criterion keeps changing during the selection process, so that there is no 
nucleus and relations exist only between individual members.
But whatever the type of  complex, they all have distinctive features, as Vygotsky 
explains: “a complex does not arise above its elements as does a concept; it merges with 
the concrete objects that compose it. this fusion of  the general and the particular, of  
the complex and its elements, this psychic amalgam… is the distinctive characteristic 
of  all complex thinking.”6 the cognitive operations of  abstraction and generalization 
are acquired in stages; they are not given apriori and then applied to empirical content 
in order to generate a genuine concept. to form a true concept, “it is also necessary 
to abstract, to single out elements, and to view the abstracted elements apart from the 
totality of  the concrete experience in which they are embedded. in genuine concept 
formation, it is equally important to unite and to separate: synthesis must be combined 
with analysis. Complex thinking cannot do both. its very essence is over-abundance, 
over-production of  connections, and weakness in abstraction.”7 as long as complexive 
thought predominates, “the abstracted trait is unstable and easily surrenders its tempo-
rary dominance to other traits. only when the abstracted criteria or traits are resynthe-
sized do genuine concepts emerge.”8
Cognitive complexes are also characterized by concrete imagery based on an indi-
vidual’s experience of  prototypes. archaic proto-categories do not map directly onto an 
aristotelian categorical schema, and this is in large part due to a significant difference 
in their respective understanding of  the genus-species relation and the idea of  a natural 
kind. eleanor rosch has presented strong evidence in favor of  the thesis that object 
grouping in a hierarchy of  more and more inclusive classes has undergone a long evo-
lutionary development. she argues that human-science disciplines have always tended 
to treat the object-taxonomies of  human cognition as basically aristotelian. in other 
words, naturally occurring object-groups are conceived as “logical, bounded entities, 
membership in which is defined by an item’s possession of  a simple set of  criterial fea-
tures.”9 she offers clear evidence that, in the ordinary everyday world, humans do not 
rely on any sort of  digital ordering of  discrete properties in order to ascribe a particular 
thing as a member of  a class. rather our normal cognitive schema relies on an ana-
logue procedure that assimilates the object and its natural group to a prototype image 
of  an ideal thing. Current research, she says, “suggests that the basic level may be the 
most inclusive level at which it is possible to form a mental image which is isomorphic to 
5. Vygotsky 962 pp. 6-2.
6. Vygotsky 962 p. 65.
7. Vygotsky 962 p. 76.
8. hallpike 979 p. 83.
9. rosch 978 p. 8.
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an average member of  the class, and thus, the most abstract level at which it is possible 
to have a relatively concrete image.”0
Perhaps more germane to our specific line of  inquiry into archaic complexes about 
human nature are some current findings about ‘primitive’ mentality. most primitive 
societies have extensive knowledge and names for species of  plants and animals, as well 
as artifact groups such as utensils, clothes, weapons, and so forth. there is ample evi-
dence that whereas, for example, there are object-groups and names for “dog”, “cattle”, 
and “pig”, there is often no object-group or name for “animal”. one striking feature of  
‘primitive’ thought in this regard, according to C. r. hallpike, is that the organization 
of  natural objects is “maximized at a particular level of  classification, at which more 
attributes will be common to members of  the category than at other levels of  classifica-
tion. it may therefore be more efficient to classify in terms of  those basic objects that are 
at the level of  abstraction for which cue validities are maximized.”
the concept of  a cue validity refers to a sensible attribute, e.g. four-footed, egg-bear-
ing, water-dwelling, etc. whose efficiency as a reliable indicator of  an object-group is pro-
portional to the frequency of  association between it and other sensible attributes. thus, 
for example, “sheep”, “cattle”, and “pig” are more useful categories than “animal”; 
and again, “knife”, “ladle”, and “pot” are more useful than “cooking utensil”. higher-
level categories, such as “animal” and “utensil” contain fewer attributes common to all 
instances of  their own category, whereas lower-level categories, e.g. “red-haired wild 
pig”, “thin short knife”, etc., have such a small reference field that it severely limits its 
usefulness beyond a narrow context. hallpike concludes that hierarchical object-group-
ing in more and more inclusive classes are of  “relatively little use in the classification of  
the world for utilitarian purposes. We are likely to find that… we, as well as primitives, 
classify primarily at a basic level; that superordinate and subordinate classification levels 
are of  relatively little significance; and that classification systems are much more reflec-
tions of  real-world structuration and much less dependent on language or on arbitrary 
cultural factors than anthropologists have commonly supposed.”2
Where there are (at least) two naturally bonded sets of  objects (species) a complex 
occurs when: (a) some of  the essential features of  what makes one group what it is are 
conjoined with (b) some of  the essential features of  what makes the other group what it is. 
in other words, in determining the properties of  a complexive groping disjoint proper-
ties have precedence over conjoint properties.3 the difference between a concept and 
a complex in part depends on the level of  causal explanation invoked to account for 
properties that members of  its class have. it must be the case that the casual explanation 
of  complexive properties does not go far enough down to account for the group being 
the class that it is. in schematic form, class [a] of  species A comprises four essential 
0. rosch 978 p. 35.
. hallpike 979 p. 200.
2. hallpike 979 p. 200.
3. this crude schema does not capture the fine-grained details of  Piaget’s thesis (nor its deficiencies), as 
spelled out by seltman 985 pp. 55-90.
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properties {1, 2, 3, 4}, sub-class [b] of  class A comprises some properties essential 
to its being a class-member of  [a] and some other properties, non-essential to [a], and 
sub-class [c] of  class A comprises some properties essential to its being a class-member 
of  [a]. in contrast, complex [d] comprises properties found in [b] and [c], none of  
which are essential to either sub-class being a class-member of  [a]. Properties {1, 2, 3} 
make [b] a sub-class of  [a] and properties {4, 5, 6} make [c] a sub-class of  [a]; but 
properties {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} are conjoint differentiae of  [b] and [c] with no traits 
common to [a].
Class [a] =  {1,  2,  3,  4},  where {1}—{4} are essential properties
Sub-class [b] = {7, 8, 9, 1, 2, 3}
Sub-class [c] = {4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12}
Complex [d] = {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12}
our methodical, philosophical claim is that archaic thought, as evinced in ancient 
egyptian, ancient iranian, and mesopotamian documents, does not work with concepts 
but with complexes whose salient features are as follows. () it does not arise above its ele-
ments as does a concept; it merges with the concrete objects that compose it; a fusion 
of  the general and the particular, of  the complex and its elements, a psychic amalgam. 
(2) its abstracted traits are unstable and easily surrender their temporary dominance to 
other traits. (3) the basic level of  complex formation may be the most inclusive level at 
which it is possible to form a mental image which is isomorphic to an average member 
of  the class, and thus, the most abstract level at which it is possible to have a relatively 
concrete image. (4) it has an over-abundance of  properties, an over-production of  con-
nections, and weakness in abstraction. hence, (5) the complexes involved in archaic 
ideas about soul, name and dream are ideas fused with their ‘objects’; they have unsta-
ble traits and prototypical instances; and are thought at the most abstract level which 
have concrete images.
iii. ComPlexiVe ideas aBout soul and ghost
the principal aspects of  human nature according to ancient egyptian documents 
comprise two main groups, one pertaining to the earthly-physical being, the other per-
taining to the unearthly-psychical being. the whole person in his earthly life comprises 
() an animate body which contains the heart and the four main organs (except the 
brain); (2) his name; (3) his shadow. the heart and the four main organs are the loci 
of  powers and exercise functions determined by (or dependent on) the whole person 
manifest in the earthly physical realm. the name and the shadow are functions of  the 
whole, dependent in their ‘nature’ on the person whose name and shadow they are, 
but independent in their meaning of  their bearer’s being embodied. the whole person 
also comprises (4) the ka and (5) the ba whose seat is the whole person and whose func-
tions are manifest in the person’s bodily states, but whose ‘natures’ are independent of  
the person in his earthly life. after death the person can become transformed into (6) a 
god-like being, the akh. every akh in its eternal changeless state is netjer (divine), like the 
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gods and demons who have always existed in the under-world. the most important idea 
underlying the egyptian ‘complex’ of  human nature is that there is only one life for all 
created, finite beings: this life is manifest (kheperu) in the earthly realm in the form of  an 
animate, bodily entity, and is manifest in the unearthly life, by way of  the mummy and 
associated practices, in the person’s akh.
one of  the more unusual aspects of  human nature is the person’s shadow, though 
its role is less clearly defined than the other aspects. like the ba (with which it was often 
confused), the shadow can become completely detached from the body after death, so 
that it can move and act freely. as with other ‘complexive’ entities associated with the 
individual, since it did indeed have a dependent relation with its owner during earthly 
life, it was thought to be an intrinsic ‘part’ of  the individual. louis Zabkar declares that 
“the egyptians conceived of  the Ka, the akh, and the Ba not only as qualities which a 
being possesses but also as entities which a being is or becomes. thus we often find the 
term Ba, sometimes qualified by an appositive or an epithet, used as an equivalent for a 
god, indicating that the god is in a state in which his power is manifest.”4 elsewhere he 
says that, “the ba which the king possesses in some cases appears to be a quality, a kingly 
attribute, while in others it seems to be an entity”.5 the idea that the ba is a median 
between an entity and a power, or perhaps a ‘complexive’ union of  both entity and 
power indicates that it does not fall neatly under the category of  substance.
the ka is yet another psycho-physical aspect of  human nature; its most common 
hieroglyph was a pair of  upraised arms, folded at the elbow. in later texts the ka-glyph 
is shown walking behind a small copy of  the individual; this probably inspired the now 
outdated interpretation of  the ka as the “double”. along with the ba and the akh, the ka 
is a baffling idea, straddling several concepts normally rendered by ideas like life-force, 
double, and soul. John taylor says that it is “a highly complex notion, which defies 
direct translation into a single english word or phrase. the nature of  the ka was multi-
faceted and, as the concept changed over time, the egyptians’ use of  the term was not 
consistent.”6 the ka came into being with an individual’s birth, fashioned by the potter 
god Khnum on his wheel, and was severed from the individual at his earthly death. 
although it was intimately connected with the person’s bodily life, it was not a physical 
entity, nor did it have a concrete form; it was only given substance through its depiction 
in funerary texts and images. Pinch says that the ka itself  is a person’s vital force, without 
a distinct personality, but when it appeared as an image it was depicted as a double.7
the ka, the ba, the akh¸ as well as the shadow and the name, are all manifestations of  
the whole person, in both his earthly and his unearthly life. the ancient egyptian word 
kheperu, rendered in english as “manifestation”, is itself  over-determined in its semantic 
range. in her recent study of  ritual curses and blessings, Katarina nordh suggests that 
our ordinary conceptual vocabulary is basically ill-equipped, if  not outright deficient, 
4. Zabkar 968, p. 8.
5. Zabkar 968, p. 73.
6. taylor 200, p. 8.
7. Pinch 994, p. 47.
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in coming to grips with “manifestation”. she says that “the word kheperu may express 
notions of  not only the existence-forms but also of  the identity and role of  a being, 
for where are the dividing lines between these concepts? the limits of  the modern con-
cepts appear to be vague and indefinite, and the ancient egyptian term kheperu would 
probably connote all of  them and even more than that. the word kheperu seems to convey 
something which all categories of  beings are capable of  becoming, being and having, 
assuming and leaving.”8 in his recent monograph on osirian solar theology in the 
new Kingdom, Jan assmann indicates that some egyptian scholars now recognize the 
need for just such a supra-ordinate concept, i.e. a cognitive complex. he says “the basic 
structure of  egyptian thinking [is] in polar opposites pairs or ‘dual units’ which express 
an abstract and complex higher concept of  ‘unification’ of  two concrete and comple-
mentary partial concepts.”9
in their recent study of  the characteristic powers and functions of  egyptian deities, 
meeks and meeks arrive at much the same finding about the gods’ manifestations. “a 
divine form constituted a totality that could not be apprehended in and of  itself, for 
such a form coincided with the very being of  the god it belonged to. it lay beyond what 
could be known or described and could only be grasped—imperfectly at that—through 
its projections. these projections constituted the kheperu, which corresponded to the 
series of  ephemeral individual forms, indefinite in number, that a divinity was capa-
ble of  assuming. none of  them could encompass the totality of  what a god was.”20 
nevertheless, meeks and meeks argue, these localized specific forms did not constitute 
a change in the god’s basic nature, instead they showed the god undergoing a process 
of  constant evolution. “each of  these forms was a facet of  the god in which he was fully 
implied. By adopting a kheperu, a god created for himself  the possibility of  signifying a 
state of  his being or distinguishing one of  his actions by individualizing it. to enter such 
a state or perform such an act was to inscribe the kheperu in visible reality. this projec-
tion, called the iru, was a perceptible, intelligible manifestation of  the god, accentuated, 
as a rule by various material attributes.” the terms kheperu and iru often occur in texts 
as synonyms, so difficult was it to distinguish between their referents; no one form was 
the exclusive property of  a single god. in general, the average person could recognize a 
god only in his or her iru, and meeks and meeks argue that only through religious and 
spiritual practices could a trained person perceive a god’s kheperu.2 again, one sees here 
8.  nordh 996, p. 5, emphasis added; the recondite title of  her monograph, aspects of  ancient egyptian 
Curses and Blessings, belies the fact that the first three chapters offer an informed, up-to-date discussion of  
egyptian theology, cosmogony, and anthropology.
9.  assmann 995, p. 50; note 67 for further references.
20.  meeks & meeks 999, p. 54.
2.  meeks & meeks 999, p. 55; according to finnestad, “the egyptian deities were encountered face to 
face, in cosmic happenings as well as in temples. they were not invisible, spiritual beings imperfectly reveal-
ing themselves in material form. the kheperu of  the deity is the spiritual and material manifestation of  
dynamic life. the focus of  attention is on the becoming of  life which… is a divine spiritual and material 
phenomenon.” finnestad in Boreas vol. 20, 989, p. 34; for some instances of  specialized priestly knowl-
edge of  the gods, see assmann 995, pp. 7-2.
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a clear indication that kheperu merges with concrete objects, its traits are unstable, and it 
is cognizable by way of  a prototypical image.
Phillipe derchain says that the ancient egyptians talked about numerous aspects 
of  the human person, aspects which are difficult to understand and without equiva-
lent in modern european languages. the commonly accepted polarity between body 
and soul cannot be applied “in every case” to the egyptian schema; it is not possible 
“to trace clear boundaries” amongst the physical, social, religious and magical fields. 
derchain suggests ordering all the essential aspects of  human nature along two axes, 
the concrete and the imaginary, arranging them from the most perceptible (observable) 
to the most private, while noting a displacement between the two series which are not 
synonymous. according to some texts, the setting or frame in which soul-like aspects 
are manifest is an ordinary human being, but other texts speak of  external entities or 
properties as falling within the domain of  the psychic amalgam. “the limits of  the per-
son are not reached by the limits of  the body and its faculties.” the inclusion of  such 
items as the stele, the tomb, the birth-stool, and so forth are claimed to be constituents 
of  an individual’s personality; “but since they also belong to other categories of  beings, 
it is impossible to establish an ontological distinction between human and the others.” 
however, “the difference is only a quantitative one, depending upon the relative partici-
pation in the two facets of  the world, the imaginary and the perceptible. the imaginary 
world is essentially composed of  the gods, who are connected to the perceptible world 
through their statues, temples, and diverse manifestations. human, by contrast, located 
essentially in the perceptible world, passes into the imaginary through the intermediary 
of  the Pharaoh, who is the incarnation of  the idea of  human and is in this way on an 
equal footing with the gods on the level of  artistic representation.”22
in the ancient near east, the akkadian language employs three principal words 
to mark out distinct aspects of  human (and animal) nature: napishtu “breath, soul, life-
force”, libbu, “heart, intention, desire”, and etemmu “ghost or double”. the principal 
meanings of  napishtu break down as follows:23 () it signifies “life, vigor, vitality, or good 
health”; the instances cited indicate it is the principle of  life, i.e. the life-force. (2) it 
can be used to signify an abundance or surplus of  life-force in the first sense; hence, it 
is most commonly translated “good health”. (3) it is used as a mass-noun for all living 
beings, though only in new Babylonian is this extended to include animals. (4) it can 
be used to mean “someone”, or in the privative sense, “no one”. (5) it can be used as a 
count-noun, i.e. in the same way that hebrew nepesh or greek psychē can mean numer-
able living things. (6) it was often used for the first-person intensive, that is, periphrastic 
for oneself, e.g. the injunction to guard someone’s life as you would your self  (= your 
own life). (7) it has the concrete meaning derived from the verb-form napāshu for breath, 
that is, as the main indication or manifestation of  the life-force within. (8) in an exter-
nalized general sense it means that which provides one with vitality and good health, 
viz. provisions or sustenance. (9) in an internalized concrete sense it means the throat 
22.  derchain 992, pp. 220, 223.
23.  Cad vol. n, pp. 296-304.
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of  neck as the conduit for breath and food; and it can also mean (0) an opening or 
air-hole of  any kind. 
entries for the akkadian word libbu24 clearly illustrate the semantic functions of  a 
cognitive complex, since it can mean () the “heart, abdomen, entrails or womb”; the 
large number of  instances cited cluster around the thorax, as that which holds or con-
tains the heart-organ. (2) it can be used in an externalized general sense to signify the 
inside or inner part of  an area or building or region. (3) it has an abstract internal sense 
that varies over several ‘complexive’ ideas: “mind, thought, intention, courage, wish, 
desire, choice or preference.” definite nuances emerge from the vast range of  diction-
ary citations: that outward actions or words can belie inward intentions, that the heart 
is the locus of  reflection and deliberation, that it is also the seat of  the emotions, that it 
is more an inner than an outer aspect, and so forth. entries for the akkadian word etem-
mu25 clearly show that it was never associated with a living human, though the gods and 
demons each have (or are) etemmu. () the gods can become the form of  an animal as its 
etemmu, i.e. the god can assume the appearance of  an animal. (2) demons are only ever 
etemmu, or perhaps one should say that they are always etemmu-like entities. (3) the gods, 
demons and dead-human etemmu are the objects of  rituals and prayers; the etemmu are 
offered food and drink; they are said to eat, drink, and move about. (4) they can some-
times be seen or heard, especially at night and/or in dreams; they can be summoned or 
called forth, by the “spirit-callers”, magicians who would later be called necromancers. 
(5) the etemmu are often said to cry out and trouble the living, either in an unspecified 
manner, i.e. by making someone unhappy or depressed, or in a very specific manner, i.e. 
when its “hand seizes someone” (this perhaps signifies epilepsy).
Based on his extensive knowledge of  ane texts, Jean Bottero offers this summary 
statement about the apparent relation between the living person and his etemmu. after 
an individual’s death, two things remained: “one was plainly material, numb and para-
lyzed and then subject to gradual erosion—his skeleton; the other formal, airy, a shady 
and volatile image of  what he was during life, but permanent—his ghost, his phantom, 
his spirit, his etemmu—active and mobile in its own way…. the relations between the 
two remains were certain and very close, because it still involved the same person who 
still bore the same proper name after death.”26 our own conclusion is that etemmu is an 
under-determined cognitive complex: either the complexive idea embraces all of  the 
predicate terms collectively as the sum of  their parts or the idea can be expressed equally 
well by any one of  these terms as parts. any hope of  coming to understand ane ideas 
about human nature by appeal to conceptual analyses of  terms such as napishtu, libbu 
and etemmu is likely to be frustrated. an adequate understanding of  the way in which 
ane texts use words like naphistu, libbu, etemmu, and so forth must take account of  cogni-
tive ‘complexes’ not concepts. human nature cannot be ascribed either immortality or 
mortality as though these opposed ideas were polarized over the presence or absence of  
24. Cad vol. l, pp. 64-76.
25. Cad, vol. e, pp. 397-40; abusch 995 pp. 588-94.
26. Bottero 992 p. 272.
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one property or condition, e.g. being death-bound. although it is certain that a human’s 
earthly life was bound by death, it is not true that life as such was bound by death. the 
fact that the archaic idea of  death signified a transition between one state and another 
does not imply that some aspect of  human being was free from termination, that it was 
separable from the host’s body at death. although it may seem incongruous from our 
modern point-of-view, the archaic ‘complex’ was more or less upside-down. the true 
or real being of  all living things was manifested in various forms, one of  which was an 
individual’s earthly form qua organic being; hence, an individual’s existence in that form 
was bound to its earthly life, and not to its death.
 Zarathustra’s thoughts about the human soul are expressed in an archaic iranian 
language (avestan) in a series of  “songs”; in their near-liturgical setting they survived 
in their original form despite acquiring numerous layers of  commentary. according to 
the “songs”, it is the Wise lord who gives body and breath to humans, who along with 
other animals have souls (urvān). the human soul is often linked with thinking (mananha) 
and reason or intellect (xratush). though the human soul can be misled and follow the 
false, it can also have (or adhere to) good thoughts and piety through following the truth. 
But it is not through possession of, or in accordance with, mananha that humans are dif-
ferentiated from other beings, since the bounteous immortals (amesha spentash) are also 
sometimes called mainyū, e.g. the good ‘spirit’ and the evil ‘spirit’. insler comments that 
two other words are “equivalent” to body and breath; astvant for kerpem and ushtāna for 
anmā.27 this seems to mean that they are strictly synonymous and there are some cases 
for the latter pair’s usage that support this assertion. however, astvant and ushtāna also 
seem to have a wider semantic field: astvant and ushtāna are the physical and psychical 
manifestations of  the two orders (or states) of  being, later called getig and menog.28 Astvant 
and ushtāna are manifest in a living human as its body (kerpem) and soul (urvān); it is in vir-
tue of  being ensouled that a human can think, have ideas, desires, and so forth. When 
the human soul is in accord with good thought and piety he is (or becomes) a virtuous 
spirit, and this is evident in “his understanding, his words, his actions [and] his ideas”, 
as the text states. 
in the conclusion of  his analysis of  the original avestan texts, shaul shaked is 
rather dubious about any attempt to find a coherent account of  human nature. he says 
that, “there is no avestan text which gives a comprehensive enumeration of  human 
faculties, powers, members of  the body, and spiritual constituents of  the person” since 
each text has a specific didactic purpose. “these texts specify either some of  the aspects 
of  the material and earthly existence of  man, or deal with the ‘soul’ components of  the 
person. each texts would thus tend to ignore notions that do not belong to its sphere of  
current interest and would, on the other hand, tend to use superfluous terms… in order 
to enforce its own particular point of  view.” although this basic incoherence is also 
present in the Pahlavi texts (some of  which preserve 5th C. BCe doctrines) the situation 
there is even more complex. With regard to the two separate spheres of  existence, the 
27.  insler’s notes to the gāthās translation, 975 pp. 69-70.
28. see Boyce 975, pp. 229-30; Zaehner 96, p. 200.
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spiritual (mēnōg) and the material (gētīg), each of  the soul components has its own ‘place’. 
according to the Dēnkard, Book iii, “the soul is the most prominent spiritual element 
within the material, as it is the entity that maintains and directs the body. a higher layer 
of  spiritual existence within the material is the presence of  the ‘essential being’, called 
in Pahlavi ox, within the soul…. Just as the soul is spiritual with regard to the material of  
the body, so ox is spiritual with regard to the relative material of  the soul. each one of  
the various spiritual entities within the [human] body has its own individual function: 
anima [or anma] gives it life, consciousness causes it to see, and the soul rules it. the soul 
has several powers, among which are intelligence, awareness, wisdom, and spirit.” With 
regard to the peculiar status of  spirit, “it is defined as being not an entity by itself, but 
attached to, or inherent in, an entity. at the same time it acts as ‘the power within the 
soul’.”29
after four decades of  important investigations into the origins and central ideas 
of  Zarathustra’s “true religion”, the great indo-iranian scholar h. lommel had this 
to say about the complex links between the avestan divinities and their creations. “for 
us [today] good Purpose and the tending of  cattle are admittedly two wholly different 
things. But must it always have been so? Could not at a certain epoch abstract and con-
crete have appeared to the human spirit as of  unified being, the abstract and inner reality of  
the concrete? so that, for instance, Pious devotion and the earth were the spiritual and mate-
rial aspects of  the same thing.”30 in the chapter on the “Bounteous immortals” in her com-
prehensive history of  the early period of  Zoroastrian religion, mary Boyce attempts to 
arbitrate between two avestan ‘concepts’: the divine ‘persons’ in their individual char-
acters and actual, material manifestations of  these powers on earth. the Bounteous 
immortals, she says, are “personifications of  what was spiritual and desirable and yet at 
the same time guardians of  the physical world in all its solidity.” the prophet himself  
was responsible for expressing this insight: “Zoroaster wove together abstract and con-
crete, spiritual and material, seeing mortality in the physical, and apprehending in all 
beneficent and wholesome things a striving, whether conscious or unconscious, towards 
the one ultimate goal—the recreation of  the [original] harmonious and happy state 
of  being.”3 Zaehner drew a very similar conclusion about Zoroaster’s appropriation 
and transmutation of  the traditional pantheon of  indo-iranian gods which, he says, 
the prophet made into “abstract concepts”. When Zoroaster turned his attention to 
the Bounteous immortals, “he conceived of  [them] not simply as abstract notions but 
as part of  the divine personality itself, as mediating functions between god and man, 
and as qualities which sanctified man can himself  acquire through the good mind with 
29.  shaked 994, pp. 43-4; shaked excerpts and translates the relevant passages in appendix e, pp. 53-
60; for the sake of  clarity, mēnōg is replaced by ‘spiritual’ and gētīg by ‘material’ in the quotation.
30.  lommel in B. schlerath 970, pp. 3-2; emphasis added.
3.  Boyce 975 vol. i, pp. 220-; in her discussion of  scholarly interpretations of  the fravashi of  the just 
dead souls, Boyce shows that lommel and soderblom could not sort out what they thought were entirely 
incompatible concepts; in their words, the ideas involved in this iranian doctrine are “incomprehensible”, 
“inconceivable”, and “contradictory”, vol. i, pp. 28-9.
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which god illuminates him.”32
iV. Words and names
our modern understanding of  the relation between words and things, between the 
verbal sign and that which is signified, has been much enriched in the last one hundred 
years by advances in structural linguistics, the process of  language acquisition, “deep” 
generative rules, phonemic patterns, and so forth. But some of  our common ideas about 
signs, meanings and things remain much as they were thought in the greek Classical 
age, for example, in aristotle’s treatise on interpretation. it is taken for granted that 
the graphic or phonic shape of  a word is arbitrary, that is, it could have a different 
sound and still refer to the same thing. the sound or written shape of  a word does not 
resemble what it names in any way. and further that the relation between the word and 
what it signifies has been established by human convention. But such a common view 
itself  has an historical origin (whatever that might be) before which ideas about words 
and names were enormously different. as Jean Bottero says about the ane view of  
language: “names were not simply flatus vocis arbitrarily attached to objects in order to 
indicate them, they were the objects themselves, given a sound. the names emanated from 
the objects they represented, and hence any similarity in sound was highly significant.” 
the author quotes an old Babylonian oracle performed on an excised liver: if  there are 
perforations (pilshu) that are pierced (palshu), it is an omen for the inhabitants of  apishal 
who were made prisoner by means of  a breach (pilshu) in the wall. Bottero comments 
that “the oracle in question at least helps us to understand how the sequence of  two 
empirically observed events could evolve into a much closer relation between the two, 
one signifying the other, which constitutes its recording in writing.” the graphic resem-
blance (near identity) between the signs shows that, given the empirical observation 
of  these events within an oracular context, one can deduce the connection between the 
events from the similarities of  their signs’ sounds. With this “scientific” attitude in place, 
“one could entirely abandon the attention paid to the material succession of  events, in 
order to concentrate on the decipherment of  those that presented themselves as being 
significant and as bearers of  written messages, by their bizarre aspect itself. that which 
was announced by unusual events was legible in the events that announced them.”33
the lengthy ane epic Atrahasis describes the stages in the creation of  the world 
and human kind; the creatures that appear in this mythical story are entirely identified 
with their written names. the extent of  this name-thing identity is so great that it is 
possible to discover and know the entire nature of  each thing through an analysis of  
its name. the names of  things are not “accidents extrinsic to the object”, but phonic 
properties of  the object. the ancient mesopotamians “were convinced that the name 
has its source, not in the person who names, but in the object that is named. that it is an 
inseparable emanation from the object, like a projected shadow, a copy, or a translation 
32.  Zaehner 96, p. 7.
33. Bottero 992 pp. 37-38.
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of  its nature. they believed this to such an extent that in their eyes ‘to receive a name’ 
and to exist… was one and the same.”34 much like Jehovah the creator in the opening 
of  the Book of  genesis, marduk the creator brings the world into being through his ver-
bal edicts. his divine creative powers are synopsized in a lengthy list of  marduk’s epi-
thets, where each name was the expression of  his decision with regard to that which is 
named. each name precisely stated the destiny of  the named object; an object’s destiny 
defined the very nature of  that entity. Bottero likens the ane idea that a name confers 
on a thing its destiny to the idea of  an inner program, for example, a genetic code. 
in contrast to our modern view that a written word fixes in graphic form the tran-
sient sound of  a spoken word, for ane writers the written sign was a transferal into 
another medium of  the actual nature of  the thing named. “in the opinion of  the 
ancient scholars of  mesopotamia, the script was fundamentally concrete and realistic. 
one did not write first of  all the word, the pronounced name of  the thing, but the thing 
itself, furnished with a name. the name was inseparable from the thing, confused with 
it…. and this written name, equal to the thing, constituted a material given, which was 
concrete, solid and comparable to a substance of  which each portion, even the smallest 
one, contained all the faculties of  the total…. one could also make use of  the word, 
just as much as one could use the thing itself. one could scrutinize the word like the 
thing, analyze it, reduce it to its elements and thus take out of  it all that it contained 
of  the reality and the intelligibility of  the thing.”35 here we see distinct characteristics 
of  the cognitive complex, and not the concept of  “word” or “name”; that the word 
was “concrete”, “inseparable” from what it signified, and “confused” with its object. 
in its graphic origins the cuneiform sign had been a picture of  a thing; but even in the 
more developed, more schematized shapes of  later periods it retained the same causal 
connections with its object. ane scholars’ knowledge of  the language permitted them 
passage to the real world; to grasp the meaning of  a divine name meant to extract that 
feature from the divine reality of  a god.
according to ancient egyptian cosmology, the breath of  life which had emanated 
from the creator god’s mouth was the same thing as the words he uttered. the sound of  
the creator god’s voice was assimilated to the food needed by created things to sustain 
life. When the world was still floating on the primeval ocean, the creator god imagined 
the names of  all things; using his voice he pronounced their names in order to endow 
them with being. the world was created by seven words spoken one after the other. the 
egyptian written language consisted of  sacred signs (hiero-glyphs) instituted by the god 
thoth; it did not function independently of  spoken language, of  which it was only a 
transcription in another medium. sacred signs maintained “an aposteriori existence” 
and were “essentially limited to a commemorative or archival function”. Writing was no 
more than “putting into form, an in-formation of  the world. With its help the gods con-
stituted the archives of  important events…. given the role writing played in the world 
of  the gods, there could be no works of  fiction there. Written signs themselves were 
34. Bottero 992 p. 97.
35. Bottero 992 pp. 99-02. 
	 COSMOS	AND	HISTORY	 236
defined as ‘imprints’ of  everything contained in creation. every living creature and 
every thing could be utilized as written signs. all divine writings without exception were 
considered ‘emanations of  re’, or faithful representations of  the will of  the creator.”36
Written language was a gift of  the gods to humans, but language itself  had been 
invented by the god thoth (whom the greeks called hermes). in the hermetic Corpus 
(2nd-3rd C. Ce), asclepius informs King ammon that the greek language is not suited 
to expressing divine truths. in contrast, “the very quality of  the speech and the sound 
of  egyptian words have in themselves the energy of  the objects they speak of.” greek 
philosophy is “an inane foolosophy (logon psophos) of  speeches, where we, by contrast, 
use not speeches but sounds that are full of  actions.”37 Plotinus had said that egyptian 
sacred signs had an intuitive power; “each carved image is knowledge and wisdom 
grasped all at once, not discursive reasoning nor deliberation.”38 When iamblichus 
spoke of  egyptian sacred signs in his treatise On the Mysteries of  Egypt, he said that there 
was “an intellectual, divine and symbolic character of  divine resemblance in the names, 
and if  this is [now] unknown to us, it is then most august since it is too mighty to be 
known by determination”, i.e. by human devices to decide about its meaning.39
V. dreams and Visions
studies in genetic psychology conducted by Jean Piaget and others have confirmed 
that there are three distinct stages in the child’s understanding of  the nature of  his own 
dreams.40 in the first stage, the dream is regarded as coming from outside and remains 
an external event; dreams occur where their dream-content is located, and the child 
dreamer actually participates as himself  in the dream-story. in the second stage, the 
child admits to the subjective, internal origin of  his dream, but will not admit that the 
image is internal and distinct from what it represents, i.e. the dream-content cannot be 
detached from physical reality. in the third and final stage, both the dream-origin and 
the dream-content are regarded as internal to the dreamer; just as thought is regarded 
by the child as “a voice in the head”, so dreams are regarded as “visions in the head”. 
this shows us that the skeptical trope about waking and dreaming appeals to a level of  
cognition which recognizes only the second stage of  concept formation and disclaims 
any intelligibility for a hypothetical third stage. for the ancient greek, the claim that 
the source and the content of  a dream are entirely internal is itself  an hypothesis, as 
strange as this may seem to us now. since they have ruled out any appeal to a higher 
cognitive level, there is no evidence that can count to support such an hypothesis. it is 
open to the same sorts of  doubts as other hypotheses which cannot be verified, such as, 
in the 4th C anyway, the claim that the earth is actually a sphere moving around the 
36. meeks & meeks 999 pp. 03-04.
37. Ch xVi Copenhaver 992 p. 58; and notes on pp. 202-3.
38. Plotinus enneads V.8.6.
39. iamblichus, on the mysteries Vii.4.254.
40. Piaget 962; hallpike 979 pp. 375-90.
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sun.4
in ane texts, the word ‘to dream’ does not constitute a specific state or action; 
there is no verb for ‘to dream’ in sumerian or akkadian. one is said ‘to see a dream’ 
(amâru and natâlu; also sometimes naplusu and šubrû), such that the dream content is 
the object of  inner sight, an internal spectacle. in Gilgamesh, the god ea wants to pre-
vent the destruction of  the entire human species and thus reveals an impending dis-
aster to the Babylonian noah. “i have revealed to atrahasis a dream, and it is thus 
that he has learned the secret of  the gods.” the most archaic example (c.2450) comes 
from the Vulture stele, where the King of  lagash, engaged in battle with his enemy 
umma, reports how the god ningirsu appeared to him in his sleep to reassure him of  
the good outcome. the King amiditana (683-47) was warned in a dream that he had 
to offer a statue of  himself  to the gods; similar reports were made by assurbanipal and 
nabonidus. since most of  the extant documents concern public affairs perhaps it is not 
too surprising that such private dream revelations are exceptional.42
dreamers in the ancient world often felt the need for expert assistance in dream 
exegesis; when gilgamesh first dreams of  enkidu, who resembles “a block from heav-
en”, he goes to his mother for interpretation. Bottero says that such cases are instances 
of  intuitive dream divination, and that there is nothing technical or rigorous about this 
kind of  dream unpacking. But deductive divination from dreams is different. first, it 
was valid for everybody. “there was no longer a question about extraordinary dreams 
and explicitly supernatural messages, which were perhaps more easily reserved for the 
great of  this world, but of  ordinary, current, daily dreams… valuable for all. Whoever 
dreamed, and whatever his dream was, that individual was the recipient of  the message 
that the dream bore. only the message was ‘written’ and ‘coded’, and to ‘read’ it one 
needed a real technician, a specialist initiated in this ‘writing’… an examiner, someone 
who looked closely at and studied the ‘pictograms’ incorporated in the dream, who 
deciphered them and translated them for the interested party who came to consult.”43 
hence, interpretation of  a dream message was conducted in much the same manner 
as reading written signs, and, since pictorial signs ‘embodied’ the nature of  the thing 
signified, reading a dream message implied attending to the pronouncement (and thus 
enactment) of  events.
the ancient egyptian language had no verb for “to dream”, only a noun “dream”. 
in their terms, one could see something “in a dream”, or see “a dream”, as a mental 
‘object’. in other words, a dream was the object of  a verb of  perception—“it was some-
thing seen, not done”, as szpakowska says. “in a sense it was not an event arising from 
within the dreamer or an activity performed by an individual; rather, it had an objective 
existence outside the will of  the passive dreamer.” this description expresses exactly 
the same complexive idea of  dream sources and dream content that developmental 
psychologists postulate for small children. “in particular, the use of  the phrase “see-
4. hallpike 979 p. 387.
42. also discussed by noegel in Bulkeley 200 pp. 45-50.
43. Bottero 992 p. 3.
	 COSMOS	AND	HISTORY	 238
ing in a dream” also indicates that the dream was considered as an alternate state or 
dimension in which the waking barriers to perception were temporarily withdrawn.”44 
the earliest known references to dreams in ancient egypt are found in the so-called 
“letters to the dead” (c.200 BCe) these letters were written to a deceased relative or 
friend, usually requesting some sort of  favor on behalf  of  the living person, and then 
left in the tomb of  the addressee. “the dreams in these texts functioned as a sort of  
liminal zone, a transparent area between the walls of  two worlds that allowed beings 
in separate spheres to see each other.” szpakowska speculates that this zone was like a 
two-way window, “allowing the living to see the dead and the dead to watch the living. 
more specifically, the dreams allowed people on earth to communicate with the inhabit-
ants of  the netherworld.”45
leo oppenheim, in his highly influential work The Interpretation of  Dreams in the ANE 
(956), said that egyptian royal dreams were typical of  “message dreams” in the ane. 
against this view, szpakowska argues that these dreams were not typical of  the egyptian 
literary tradition until the new Kingdom when they make their first rare appearance. 
With one exception, the dreams usually cited to support this claim are late Period and 
hellenistic descriptions attributed to earlier pharaohs, “which bear little resemblance to 
the dream anecdotes recorded centuries earlier.”46 there is a single, very rare dream-
book (Papyrus Chester Beatty iii), dated in the reign of  ramesses ii; it is the only onei-
romantic manual that has been found in pre-hellenic egypt. it records 227 dreams and 
their interpretation, divided into three sections. the first is composed of  visual images 
and their interpretation; the second is a spell to counter a bad dream; and the third 
offers a detailed description of  the characteristics of  the “followers of  seth”, and then 
reports of  their dreams. this dream-book has been the subject of  a great deal of  specu-
lation but it is still the only text for dream interpretation until the end of  the nubian 
dynasty (650 years later). szpakowska points out that “even this dream book is suspect, 
for it is not clear that it was ever actually used. it is possible that it was kept as a curiosity 
or as a literary exercise and did not necessarily require a specialist to be used. for nearly 
the first 2000 years of  egypt’s history, there is no extant evidence for the mantic use of  
dreams nor for rituals designed to solicit dreams.”47
however, important clues can be discerned with regard to the status of  dream 
images irrespective of  their approved style of  interpretation. instruction texts from c.200 
mention that dreams can be used as metaphors to accentuate what is insubstantial, 
ephemeral, or uncontrollable. medical texts include several prophylactic spells designed 
to resist bad dreams; sometimes dreams were thought to be undesirable, even hostile 
forces to be guarded against and repelled in the so-called execration formulae. there 
are numerous medical-magical remedies listed for relief  from nightmares, including 
poultices, apotropaic spells on pillows, and amuletic decrees worn around the neck 
44. szpakowska in Bulkeley 200 p. 3.
45. szpakowska in Bulkeley 200 p. 3.
46. szpakowska in Bulkeley 200 p. 32.
47. szpakowska in Bulkeley 200 p. 34.
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while sleeping. examination of  these sleep-spells reveals some interesting facts about 
dreamers and their dreams in the new Kingdom. “they were qualified as having been 
seem in the past and the future; deities had the ability to change the nature of  dreams 
already seen and as yet unseen, others could see or be caused to see dreams for an indi-
vidual; and dreams could have an intent.”48 great changes took place in the late Period 
and this effected dreams as well: from this time on, solicited oracles and spontaneous 
wonder signs were woven into the fabric of  egyptian society; this is reflected both in the 
content of  recorded dreams and in attitudes to their dreams.
Vi. Category, Class, and genus-sPeCies
one puzzling group of  ane texts are known as catalogue treatises, lengthy lists of  
certain types of  observable phenomena. in these catalogues, “each of  the categories 
also had to be scrutinized and inventoried in all its eccentric forms, which presupposed 
a complete and exact notion of  their normal appearances… in each treatise a very 
well developed operational diagram was systematically used, and it was adapted to the 
subject matter in question. it was a type of  grid that was laid over the object or over ele-
ments of  it that could be isolated.” thus, even lexical lists were calibrated with regard to 
prototypical instances, deviant properties were treated under operational rules (and not 
abstract ideas); every category comprised an over-abundance of  properties and an over-
production of  connections with other things. “as a framework of  inquiry, it permitted 
recalling anything of  its abnormal appearance: [] size, [2] number or [3] volume; 
[4] absolute or relative position; [5] shape; [6] coloration; [7] presence of  adventitious 
elements, etc. and the various conjectures about these elements were methodically 
classified in a constant order with a painstaking rigor. each eventuality was the object 
of  a separate rubric, and all were exhibited in the same grammatical form, repeated 
ad nauseam, as so many hypotheses, or ‘protases’, each followed by their results, or 
‘apodoses’.”49 
in addition to the lexical lists and tablets of  mantic inferences, there are also indi-
vidual treatises on specific subjects. “Just like the words in the lists, the situations in the 
treatises represent universal things; prototypes that are everywhere and always valid. 
hence, they obtain their character of  profound knowledge and of  importance to objects 
in general, surpassing individuality, time and space. in other words, these treatises have 
a scientific character that is even more obvious than it is in the lists.”50 something 
similar appears in various treatises on dream divination, texts arranged with columnar 
series in an inductive or inferential format. in the treatise known as “oh, dream god” 
(c.900-000 BCe) “each entry is introduced by an hypothesis (which grammarians call 
‘protasis’), to underline the theme of  the dream taken as an omen, and ended with an 
‘apodosis’ to draw from it the pertinent prediction. as in all other divinatory collec-
48. szpakowska in Bulkeley 200 p. 36.
49. Bottero 992 p. 4.
50. Bottero 992 p. 4; on the lexical lists, see also leick 200 pp. 73-76.
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tions and treatises, these omens were carefully classified by their principal elements.”5 
the scientific character of  ane divinatory texts “explains well the elements that are 
revealed from the oldest treatises on. notably the wish to analyze and systematize 
which strikes the readers of  these documents so much. in each treatise the oracular 
object is taken apart in a sometimes surprising number of  ominous appearances…. 
these analyses and classifications are usually done according to a certain number of  
recurring categories: [] the presence of  an object or its absence; [2] its quantity and [3] 
its dimensions; [4] its internal disposition and [5] its relative position; [6] its coloring, 
which is sometimes extended to some ten different hues around the principal colors, 
which in those days were red, white, black, and yellow-green; [7] then the addition or lack 
of  nonessential elements; and so on. all these eventualities are ranked in an order that is 
quite rigorous and constant.”52
thus, what one finds here is something like a common-sense ontology, from which 
springs a common-sense physics, and a quasi-scientific scheme of  induction. goody 
explains an ancient egyptian text-list, the onomasticon of  amenopē, in the follow-
ing terms: it exhibits an ordering of  discontinuous, discrete elements taken from daily 
speech and activities; arranged in rows and columns, the items can be read from left to 
right or right to left, and from top to bottom or from bottom to top. they are bounded 
at the start and the end, which helps to clarify the categories as well as promote an 
exhaustive enumeration. such lists help to encourage the hierarchical arrangement of  
categories, from general to particular, and the tacit selection of  criteria of  inclusion. 
the onomasticon is entitled by the scribe “the teaching for clearing the mind, for 
instruction of  the ignorant and for learning all things that exist”. the modern editor 
of  the text broke down the 600 entries under the following headings: i introductory 
heading; ii sky, water, earth; iii Persons, court officials, occupations; iV Classes, tribes, 
and types of  human beings; V the towns of  egypt; Vi Buildings, their parts, and types 
of  land; Vii agriculture, cereal, and other products; Viii Beverages; ix Parts of  an ox 
and kinds of  meat.
goody commented that the scribe had aimed at some sort of  rational classification, 
from the highest to the lowest, and from the general to the particular. in reading this 
vast list, one can discern “the dialectical effect of  writing upon classification. on one 
hand it sharpens the outlines of  the categories; one has to make a decision [for exam-
ple] as to whether rain or dew is of  heaven or of  earth.” the start and end of  each 
cluster is set off  with stylistic marks, providing an easy though fluid grouping. “as the 
items within a list are set in an implicit hierarchy by the order of  listing… so too the first 
level clusters may be grouped in a similar way, either by further levels of  clustering… or 
in a simple linear hierarchy, which gives some overall order to the clusters and their con-
stituent items.”53 the reader of  this catalogue may be reminded of  Borges’ delightful 
5. Bottero 992 p. 6.
52.  Bottero 992 p. 34; on ane divination in general, see von soden 994 pp. 53-7; Bottero’s reference 
to “the addition or lack of  nonessential elements” clearly indicates a characteristic of  complexes.
53. goody 977, pp. 00-04.
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citation of  the entry for “animal” in an imaginary Chinese encyclopedia: (a) those that 
belong to the emperor; (b) embalmed ones; (c) those that are trained; (d) suckling pigs; 
(e) mermaids; (f) fabulous ones; (g) stray dogs; (h) those that are included in this classifi-
cation; (i) those that tremble as if  they were mad; (j) innumerable ones; (k) those drawn 
with a fine camel-hair’s brush; (l) others; (m) those that have just broken the flower vase; 
(n) those that at a distance resemble flies.54 aside from (h) which implies a type-paradox 
and higher-order logical recursion, the list as it stands might well have been written by 
an egyptian or assyrian scribe.
in ane records the baffling idea of  the divine me referred to an entire cultural 
area, an acquisition of  civilized life; but at the same time it is also the result of  an inven-
tion, a divine decision. Bottero comments that “this term is obscure to us and difficult 
to understand, as it does not correspond to any of  our semantic categories. it translates 
a point of  view that is far removed from ours and that cannot be directly related to our 
own.” the me are always related to the gods who are the only ones who hold them. in 
this sense they are like the specific contents of  the divine plans, of  the destinies assigned 
by the gods to all beings, animate and inanimate. and precisely because they are only 
in the hands of  the gods, the me also indicate the power of  each of  them over a par-
ticular domain.55 an important very old myth locates the repository of  divine me in the 
ocean deeps under the control of  the god enki. the titular goddess of  uruk, inanna, 
carries out a cunning plan to steal the me from enki and relocate them in her city, so 
that their manifold potential can be actualized. in this context, g. lieck says that the 
me are “all those institutions, forms of  social behavior, emotions, signs of  office, which 
in their totality were seen as indispensable for the smooth operation of  the world.” 
When inanna liberates the me from the ocean’s depths she not only enhances her own 
power, but also implements their decrees amongst humankind. “the list of  me includes 
kingship, priestly offices, crafts and music, as well as intercourse, prostitution, old age, 
justice, peace, silence, slander, perjury, the scribal arts, and intelligence, among many 
others.”56
archaic egyptian and ancient near eastern proto-categories do not map directly 
onto the aristotelian categorical schema, and this is in large part due to a significant dif-
ference in their respective understanding of  the genus-species relation and the idea of  
a natural kind. Philosophical reflection on the varieties of  classification into categories 
before aristotle’s work show that they were working, not with concepts of  ‘kinds’, but with 
complexes which are ideas fused with their ‘objects’, with unstable traits and prototypi-
cal instances, thought at the most abstract level which have concrete images. Von soden 
says that, “the sumerians were unable to present their ideas in a connected fashion…. 
54. Jorge luis Borges, “John Wilkins’ analytical language” in the total library: non-fiction 922-986. 
allen lane/the Penguin Press, 2000 pp. 229-32; the source for michel foucault’s extended reflections in 
the order of  things, london: tavistock, 970, pp. xv-xxiv.
55. Bottero 992 p. 237.
56. lieck 200 pp. 22-23; see esp. g. farber-flügge, der mythos inanna und enki unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der liste der me. rome, 973.
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thus, sumerian science lacked the conceptual framework of  formulated principles (what 
in the West has been called ‘natural laws’), and simply ordered nominal expressions 
one after the other in a one-dimensional fashion, without any kind of  elucidation.”57 
this basic insight, that ane patterns of  thought lacked conceptual stability, is echoed 
by g. lieck when she contrasts ane pictorial and semi-pictorial writing systems with 
later phonetic writing systems. With the benefit of  a writing form that could represent 
sounds as opposed to images and could refer to ‘objects’ through non-causal (symbolic) 
relations, abstract thought in concepts escaped from the constraints of  under-deter-
mined complexes. in her words, “the conceptual ordering of  the world was thus freed 
from the constraints of  naming and the confines of  the specific written sign. Perhaps 
this helps to explain the difference between the greek capacity for abstract and rational 
thought and the apparent lack of  it in mesopotamian thinking.”58
in summary, the egyptian ka and ba were median entities, halfway between a sub-
stance and a power; much like heat and cold in Presocratic cosmic theory, they were 
hybrid property-things. the ka is a human’s life-force, but it has no concrete matter 
nor any form of  its own; it assumes the form of  a ‘double’ when it is depicted in a 
written sign. the basic pattern of  archaic ideas about human nature is the ‘dual unit’, 
a complexive amalgam of  two (or more) lower-level concepts. egyptian divine mani-
festation merges with the concrete objects it is projected upon. the ane word etemmu 
is an under-determined cognitive complex: either the complexive idea embraces all of  
the predicate terms collectively as the sum of  their parts or the idea can be expressed 
equally well by any one of  these terms as parts. in much the same way ane names were 
not simply voiced sounds arbitrarily attached to objects in order to indicate them, they 
were the objects themselves, given a sound. the names emanated from the objects they rep-
resented, and hence any similarity in sound was highly significant. in ancient egyptian 
and ane dream texts, there is no verb “to dream”, one can see a dream; it is an act of  
internal perception, directed at an inner object whose ‘author’ and setting are external 
to the dreamer. the interpretation of  a dream message was conducted in much the 
same manner as reading written signs, and, since pictorial signs ‘embodied’ the nature 
of  the thing signified, reading a dream message implied attending to the pronounce-
ment (and thus enactment) of  events. ane lexical lists and catalogue treatises, espe-
cially ones connected with divinatory practices, attempt to organize words and things 
within a rigid, overly detailed frame, a grid-like structure superposed on fluid unstable 
instances. these texts were calibrated with regard to prototypical instances, deviant 
properties were treated under operational rules (and not abstract ideas); every category 
comprised an over-abundance of  properties and an over-production of  connections 
with other things.
dr. Paul s. macdonald 
murdoch university
57. Von soden 994 p. 46, emphasis added.
58. lieck 200 p. 76.
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